Layer-5 pyramidal neurons, apical dendrites, higher-order thalamus, thalamocortical circuits, association cortex, sensory systems, hippocampal/memory systems, neuromodulatory systems, valuation systems, interoceptive systems, gene-regulatory/plasticity systems
In plain language
A missing report or changed conscious outcome does not by itself tell us where the causal change occurred. The same endpoint can reflect differences built over development, present motivational or bodily constraints, whether a candidate state formed, whether the relevant realization-related processing occurred, whether the state remained stable, or whether it was later remembered or successfully reported.
The framework organizes those possibilities by causal depth and asks experiments to distinguish neighboring alternatives rather than infer mechanism from a terminal response. Historical explanations carry an additional burden: a past event must leave a persistent internal or environmental change that alters later processing, and the historical account loses additional explanatory force if present-state variables already capture the relevant susceptibility.
Abstract
Psychological explanations of conscious experience span development, learning, perception, memory, motivation, affect, and neural mechanism. Prior work already establishes that similar surface outcomes can arise from different mechanisms, that intervention is central to causal explanation of consciousness, and that developmental history and plasticity shape later processing. This article integrates those established ideas into a provenance-first framework with six consciousness-relevant roles: developmental construction, present constraint, candidate-state formation, an admission/recurrent realization complex, stabilization when separable, and downstream use. Its proposed contribution is the specific localization discipline linking those roles to a negative-report causal-dissociation matrix, a measurement seam between phenomenality and report, and adjacent-depth evidence requirements. The framework also extends longitudinally: a claimed historical update must be linked to a persistent internal or environmental change and to altered later processing, while losing explanatory force if contemporaneous state variables fully capture the relevant susceptibility. No dendritic, thalamocortical, molecular, or developmental mechanism is claimed as novel or identical to phenomenality.
Why it matters
Consciousness research often depends on report, detection, memory, or behavior as measurement channels. Those channels are useful, but each can fail at a different point downstream of the target phenomenon. A stage-resolved provenance framework makes those alternatives explicit and helps prevent a negative report from being treated as direct evidence that a stimulus or state was never phenomenally present.
The proposal does not introduce a new neural gate or identify any particular dendritic, thalamocortical, molecular, or developmental mechanism with consciousness. Its contribution is inferential: it specifies what evidence would be needed to localize a causal difference across adjacent explanatory depths and where stronger claims should collapse when that evidence is absent.
If useful, the framework provides a common way to connect developmental history, present cognitive state, neural realization, persistence, and later report without treating those levels as interchangeable explanations of the same endpoint.